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CHAE CHAN PING v. UNITED STATES: 
IMMIGRATION AS PROPERTY 
ROSE CUISON VILLAZOR* 
Introduction 
There is arguably no other case that is more familiar to immigration legal 
scholars than Chae Chan Ping v. United States.1 Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese 
laborer and long-term non-citizen resident of the United States found 
himself excluded at the border after a trip to China.2 Border officers denied 
him entry under an amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act,3 which 
voided the certificate to re-enter the United States that Ping obtained prior 
to embarking on his trip to China.4 Ping challenged the constitutionality of 
the Chinese Exclusion Act but ultimately failed.5 Upholding Ping’s 
exclusion, the Supreme Court declared that Congress’s power to “exclude 
aliens from its territory is a proposition” that is not open to controversy.6 
Moreover, maintaining that “jurisdiction over its own territory . . . is an 
incident of every independent nation,” the Court explained that if the 
United States did not have the ability to exclude non-citizens, it would 
mean that “it would be subject . . . to the control over another power.”7 
Crucially, the Court stated that Congress’s decision to deny entry to non-
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law & Martin Luther King Jr. Research Scholar, University of 
California at Davis School of Law. This Essay builds on and provides historical context to 
my remarks at the Oklahoma Law Review’s Symposium on Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). I am indebted to Kit Johnson for inviting me to participate in 
such an enriching symposium. This Essay benefitted tremendously from feedback that I 
received from participants and attendees at the symposium and a faculty workshop at 
Fordham University Law School. I am also grateful to Eleanor Brown, Hanoch Dagan, 
Kevin Johnson, Peter Lee, Melissa Murray, Joseph Singer, and Leti Volpp for their 
comments on earlier versions of this Essay and to Andrew Alfonso (’15), Sarah Chi (’15), 
Anna Pifer-Foote (’16), and Steven Vong (’16) for their excellent research assistance.  
 1. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). For an in-depth examination 
of this case, see Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of 
Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 5-29 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 
2005) [hereinafter Chin, Chae Chan Ping]. 
 2. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582. 
 3. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).  
 4. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, § 2, 25 Stat. 504, 504 (1888).  
 5. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 610-11. 
 6. Id. at 603. 
 7. Id. at 603-04. 
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citizens is “conclusive upon the judiciary.”8 In so doing, the Supreme Court 
laid the foundation for the federal government’s plenary power over 
immigration.9 Chae Chan Ping remains good law today and continues to 
support the federal government’s virtually unfettered power to regulate and 
enforce immigration law. 10  
The 125th year anniversary of this foundational immigration and 
constitutional law case11 offers an appropriate time to revisit it. In this 
Essay, I explore an overlooked aspect of Ping’s challenge: Ping’s argument 
that his right to re-enter the United States constituted a property right. In 
particular, Ping contended that the government-issued certificate that he 
acquired prior to leaving the United States gave him the right to return to 
the United States.12 Such right was based on “title or right to be in [the 
United States] when the writ issued.”13 Importantly, Ping claimed that this 
right could not be “taken away by mere legislation” because it was “a 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. at 606. 
 9. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) [hereinafter Chin, 
Segregation]; Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 
47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 896-97 (2015); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the 
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255. But see Maureen 
Callahan VanderMay, The Misunderstood Origins of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 35 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 147, 152-57 (1999) (arguing, among other things, that Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States provides little support for the plenary power doctrine). 
 10. Shoba Sivaprased Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration & the National Security 
Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485, 1525 (2010) (explaining that Chae Chan Ping has 
never been overruled). A recent Westlaw search using the terms “130 U.S. 581” showed that 
at least 231 reported cases cited Chae Chan Ping. For a more recent discussion of the 
plenary power doctrine in light of recent caselaw, see Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is 
Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21 (2015), 
http://michiganlawreview.org/plenary-power-is-dead/.  
 11. Curiously, despite Chae Chan Ping’s importance to the development of the federal 
government’s plenary power over immigration law, it does not seem to be a case that has 
received significant attention in constitutional law casebooks. The following casebooks do 
not include the case: GREGORY E. MAGGS & PETER J. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2d ed. 2011); GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET, & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 2013). 
These casebooks feature the case: PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL 
REED AMAR, & REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (6th ed. 
2014); JONATHAN VARAT, WILLIAM COHEN, & VIKRAM AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES 
AND MATERIALS (13th ed. 2009). 
 12. See infra Part II.  
 13. See id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/7
2015]      CHAE CHAN PING: IMMIGRATION AS PROPERTY 139 
 
 
valuable riht like an estate in lands.”14 Similar to his other claims,15 the 
Supreme Court rejected this property argument. The Court’s treatment of 
his property claim is understandable because Ping’s contention may 
perhaps be described as “new property,”16 which did not become legible to 
courts until several decades later.17  
In reconsidering Ping’s property arguments, I aim to achieve two goals. 
First, as a thought piece, this Essay aims to show what the plenary power 
doctrine might have looked like had Ping succeeded in convincing the 
Court that his right to return constituted a property right. Second, this Essay 
highlights the intersections between property law and immigration law and 
the ways in which individual property rights might serve as limiting 
principles to the Supreme Court’s formulation of the nation’s absolute right 
to exclude non-citizens from the United States.  
Part I briefly discusses the facts of Chae Chan Ping. Part II explains 
Ping’s argument that his government-issued certificate of re-entry gave rise 
to a property violation and analyzes the Supreme Court’s treatment of his 
claim. Part III places Ping’s argument within the context of property law’s 
development and considers the difference that recognition of his claim 
would have made to the plenary power doctrine. Part IV calls for further 
exploration of the ways in which property law may promote a more 
inclusive immigration law. Part V briefly concludes. 
I. Chae Chan Ping v. United States 
Arriving in the United States in 1875,18 Chae Chan Ping was one of 
approximately 138,941 Chinese who had immigrated to the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See Brief of Appellant at 5, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) 
(No. 1446) [hereinafter Carter, Appellant Brief] (emphasis omitted). 
 15. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing Ping’s other claims as to 
why the Chinese Exclusion Act was unconstitutional, including that he had a contract with 
the United States and that the law constituted an ex post facto law).  
 16. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785-87 (1964) (arguing that 
certain forms of government entitlements and benefits should be recognized as property). I 
thank Melissa Murray for suggesting this point to me. 
 17. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 138 n.2 (1974) (citing Reich’s work in 
holding that job security is a form of property); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 
(1970) (citing Reich’s work in recognizing welfare benefits as a form of property); City of 
Clearwater v. Garretson, 355 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Reich’s 
work and holding that employment interests constitute property). 
 18. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.  
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between 1870 and 1880.19 Their immigration to the United States was made 
possible by the Burlingame Treaty—a treaty that was signed between China 
and the United States in 186820—that guaranteed the citizens of both 
countries the same rights and privileges that they would enjoy in their own 
countries.21 Although Chinese were not eligible for naturalization,22 the 
Burlingame Treaty recognized their right to acquire permanent residence in 
the United States.23 By 1880, there were approximately 105,465 Chinese 
residing in the United States, which represented less than 2% of the overall 
population at that time.24 
Most of these Chinese migrants were laborers who toiled in the Gold 
Rush and worked for railroad companies in California.25 By the mid-1870s, 
racial animosity and economic recession in California led to calls for 
restricting the migration of Chinese.26 Thus, the Burlingame Treaty was 
amended on November 17, 1880, to restrict the prospective migration of 
Chinese.27 Those laborers already in the United States, however, could 
continue to reside in the country and could also leave and come back to the 
United States.28  
Against this hostile background, Ping and other Chinese continued to 
reside in California and the West Coast. Anti-Chinese sentiments, however, 
continued. California residents in particular sought to further restrict 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing the population of Chinese 
between 1870 and 1880).  
 20. Burlingame Treaty, U.S.-China, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739 (1868). 
 21. See id. 
 22. Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254 (limiting naturalization to non-
citizens who were white or of African descent); see also Thind v. United States, 261 U.S. 
204, 215 (1923) (concluding that an Indian immigrant was not eligible for naturalization 
because he was not white); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1922) (holding 
that a Japanese immigrant was not eligible for citizenship because he was not white).  
 23. See Burlingame Treaty, supra note 20, art. 5; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 592-93 
(noting that Article 5 of the Burlingame Treaty provided that the United States and China 
recognized the “inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, 
and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration . . . for purposes of . . . 
permanent resid[ence]”). 
 24. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing the population of Chinese 
in 1880). 
 25. See Freddy Funes, Note, Beyond the Plenary Power Doctrine: How Critical Race 
Theory Can Help Move Us Past the Chinese Exclusion Case, 11 SCHOLAR 341, 343-44 
(2009) (discussing the reasons Chinese immigrants went to California).  
 26. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 8.  
 27. See id.  
 28. See id. (explaining that laborers already in the United States could carry 
documentation when they left the country to be readmitted).  
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Chinese migration because “the presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful 
effect upon the material interests of the state” and “their immigration was in 
numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion.”29 Congress 
complied in 1882 when it passed “An Act to Execute Certain Treaty 
Stipulations Relating to Chinese.”30 Enacted on May 6, 1882, this Act, 
which would more popularly be known as the Chinese Exclusion Act,31 
suspended “the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States.”32 Similar 
to the 1880 amendment to the Burlingame Treaty, Chinese laborers already 
in the United States on November 17, 1880 could remain in the country and 
freely leave and reenter the United States.33  
By the time Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, Ping had been a 
resident of San Francisco for seven years.34 At some point, he decided that 
he would like to visit China. Because both the 1880 amendment to the 
Burlingame Treaty and Chinese Exclusion Act itself provided that he would 
be able to return, Ping had no reason to believe that he would be barred 
from coming back. Indeed, Ping was likely confident that he would be able 
to return to his country of residence. The Chinese Exclusion Act provided 
that the government would issue to a Chinese laborer who had been present 
in the United States prior to November 17, 1880, a certificate which “shall 
entitle the Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return to and re-
enter the United States.”35 Congress amended the law in 1884—apparently 
to address evasions by Chinese36—and provided that certificates would 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595. For a discussion of the history of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act, see Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 8-9; Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the 
Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of 
Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1120 (1998); John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and 
Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55, 96 (1996). 
 30. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).  
 31. The press used this term as early as 1888. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1888, at 4.  
 32. Chinese Exclusion Act § 1, 22 Stat. at 58. 
 33. Id. § 3, 22 Stat. at 59. The Act also did not apply to Chinese laborers within ninety 
days of the passage of the Act. See id. The law also did not apply to Chinese laborers who 
left before Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. See Chew Heong v. United 
States, 112 U.S. 536, 560 (1884) (holding that since Heong left in 1881 before the Chinese 
Exclusion Act required that he obtain a certificate before leaving the United States, then the 
law did not apply to him). 
 34. See Carter, Appellant Brief, supra note 14, at 4 (explaining that Ping was a resident 
of California for twelve years prior to June 2, 1887). 
 35. Chinese Exclusion Act § 4, 22 Stat. at 59-60. 
 36. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 598.  
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count as the only “‘evidence permissible to establish [the] right of 
reentry.’”37 Relying on these laws, Ping acquired a certificate38 and, on 
June 2, 1887, he sailed for China after having been a California resident for 
twelve years.39 Approximately one year and four months later, on October 
7, 1888, Ping presented his certificate when his ship arrived in San 
Francisco.40  
Little did Ping know that just a few days before his arrival, Congress 
passed yet another amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act. This 
amendment was significant because it provided that “every certificate 
heretofore issued in pursuance [of the law] is declared void and of no effect, 
and the Chinese laborer claiming admission . . . shall not be permitted to 
enter the United States.”41 In other words, the certificate that Ping had 
carried as proof of his lawful right to return to the United States was null 
and void. Ping was excluded from the border and detained.42  
II. Ping’s Property Claim to Re-Enter the United States 
Represented by counsel, Ping challenged the denial of his entry and 
detention under the Chinese Exclusion Act.43 A person by the name of Jaia 
Mon Tong filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of Ping on October 10, 
1888.44 Unfortunately for Ping, the circuit court judges upheld the Chinese 
Exclusion Act and ruled that Ping was “expressly forbidden” by the Act.45 
Ping immediately appealed to the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 582; see Chae Chan Ping’s Reentry Certificate, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 2 (2015). 
 39. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, § 2, 25 Stat. 504, 504 (1888). 
 42. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582 (stating that Ping was detained on his boat 
after being denied entry); Paul Yin, The Narratives of Chinese-American Litigation During 
the Chinese Exclusion Era, 19 ASIAN AM. L.J. 145, 152 (2012) (explaining that a few months 
after the case, Chae Chan Ping was deported and banned from returning).  
 43. Ping was represented by four lawyers who were considered to be the “Dream Team” 
of that time. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining that Ping’s lawyers 
were “elite lawyers of the day”). Notably, many of the lawyers of the period that represented 
Chinese laborers in challenging the Chinese Exclusion Act were not working pro bono but 
rather working on behalf of railroad companies, who had an economic interest in overturning 
the law because Chinese worked for lower wages than other workers. See id. 
 44. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, October 
1888 Term, Transcript of Record, No. 1446, In the Matter of Chae Chan Ping on Habeas 
Corpus, at 1 (petition filed by Jaia Mon Tong) [hereinafter Transcript of Record] (on file 
with the Oklahoma Law Review). 
 45. In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431, 437 (C.C.N.D. 1888). 
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On appeal, Ping emphasized that his case had a broad impact in that the 
lower court’s approval of the revocation of his certificate impacted many 
other Chinese. As he noted in his “Motion to Advance” to the Supreme 
Court, there were “many thousands of these certificates outstanding.”46 
Indeed, at least one scholar noted that there were perhaps 30,000 Chinese 
who were residents of the United States but had left the country who had 
obtained re-entry certificates prior to leaving.47 Moreover, Ping urged the 
Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion 
Act so “that those who have acquired property interests here may take some 
means of protecting those interests.”48 According to the Chinese Consulate 
at that time, Chinese laborers who had left with certificates had property 
interests in the United States in the “amounts [of] several millions of 
dollars.”49 
In seeking to overturn the Chinese Exclusion Act, Ping raised a number 
of arguments on appeal. Scholars have examined in detail several of these 
arguments, including that his exclusion violated rights that he obtained 
under a treaty between the United States and China,50 that the denial of his 
re-entry constituted a violation of a contract that he had with the United 
States51 and that the law was an ex post facto law.52 Less scholarly attention 
has been fully devoted to the nature of his claim that his exclusion violated 
his property rights.53  
  
                                                                                                                 
 46. See Transcript of Record, supra note 44, at Motion to Advance, at 3. 
 47. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 11. 
 48. See Transcript of Record, supra note 44, at Motion to Advance, at 2. 
 49. Id. at 3. 
 50. See, e.g., Angela Banks, The Trouble with Treaties: Immigration and Judicial 
Review, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1219, 1227-31 (2010) (examining Ping’s challenge to the 
Chinese Exclusion Act as a violation of treaties between the United States and China). 
 51. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, United States Immigration Policy: Contract or Human 
Rights Law?, 32 NOVA L. REV. 309, 314-15 (2008) (noting Ping’s contract claim, which the 
Supreme Court rejected). 
 52. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 11-16. 
 53. To be sure, scholars have noted that Ping did have a property claim, which he 
contended emanated from treaties that were signed between China and the United States. See 
Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 15; Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in 
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary 
Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 69-76 (2002) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of Ping’s claimed vested property rights violation based on treaties 
between the United States and China). Yet, the literature has yet to fully explore the scope of 
Ping’s property-based arguments. 
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A. Ping’s Claim That He Had a Vested Property Right to Return 
In three separate briefs to the Supreme Court, Ping’s lawyers put forward 
four arguments as to why his exclusion from the United States constituted a 
violation of his property rights.54 One argument focused on the concept of 
the state intentionally conferring on Ping what constitutes a property right. 
In particular, one of his lawyers, George Hoadly—whose brief was the 
lengthiest of all three submitted briefs—contended that the plain language 
of an 1881 treaty between China and the United States demonstrated that 
Congress intended “to vest appellant with the right to re-enter the United 
States.”55 Using statutory analysis, Hoadly emphasized that section four of 
the treaty used the word “entitle” to grant to the Chinese laborers the right 
to return. He explained that, “[t]he word ‘entitle’” was not loosely or idly 
adopted. It is a word of vesting, descriptive of an acquired condition, right 
or title.”56 Thus, Hoadly asserted that Congress essentially functioned as the 
“grantor” who conveyed to Ping, the “grantee” title, or the right to come 
                                                                                                                 
 54. It is unclear whether Ping raised his property arguments during the habeas corpus 
hearing. The record does not include a transcript of the hearing itself. Moreover, the habeas 
corpus petition that was filed on his behalf did not make specific property arguments but 
instead made a general argument that the Chinese Exclusion Act was invalid. The circuit 
court, in upholding the law, relied on three grounds for ruling against Ping (which 
presumably addressed arguments raised during the habeas corpus hearing): (1) there was no 
contract between Ping and the United States; (2) that Congress had the authority to pass the 
Chinese Exclusion Act and override previous treaties governing Chinese laborers; and (3) 
the Chinese Exclusion Act did not constitute an ex post facto law. See In re Chae Chan Ping, 
36 F. 431 (C.C.N.D. 1888). Thus, the circuit did not specifically address a property 
argument that may have been raised during the hearing. Nevertheless, a closer look at the 
opinion alludes to what Ping would raise as a property rights violation on appeal. In 
particular, the circuit court, in responding to Ping’s claim that he was “divested a right [that 
was] indefeasibly vested,” explained: 
 Some rights accrue and become indefeasibly vested by covenants or 
stipulations that have ceased to be executory and have become fully executed, 
as in the case of title to property acquired thereunder. But we do not regard the 
privilege of going and coming from one country to another as of this class of 
rights.  
Id. at 432. Here, the court appears to be referring to rights associated with the system of 
estates in land in which a defeasible fee has yet to become indefeasible until the happening 
of an event, which leads to the estate becoming an absolutely indefeasibly vested fee. See 28 
AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 142 (updated Feb. 2015). 
 55. See George Hoadly, Brief for Appellant at 34, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446). [hereinafter Hoadly, Brief for Appellant]. 
 56. Id. at 35.  
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back to the United States, when it provided in the 1881 treaty that Ping 
would be able to return.57  
Convincing the Court to accept that the government intended to convey 
Ping a property right was critical and relates to a second property argument: 
that such property cannot be taken without due process of law. Once a 
“thing” is considered property, it gains paramount protection from the 
law.58 Hoadly’s brief maintained that Ping’s “right to return . . . and resume 
his actual residence in California, and to remain” in the United States are as 
“secure from legislative intrusion and disturbance as would have been his 
title to and possession of property acquired by the permission of treaty 
stipulations.”59 In other words, Ping’s vested property right to return is akin 
to ownership in fee simple absolute that would have received protection 
under the treaties. Indeed, Hoadly’s brief emphasized this point. He noted, 
“He who is ‘entitled’ cannot be divested, except by the process of eminent 
domain or during a state of war.”60  
Another one of Ping’s lawyers, James Carter, expanded on the argument 
regarding the protection that law ought to accord to property rights. 
Conceding that the federal government has the power to deny “the entry 
into its territories of the subjects of a foreign state,”61 Carter nevertheless 
argued that Congress did not have the right to “prohibit the return to this 
country of the appellant.”62 Ping had a “vested right to return, which could 
not be taken from him by an exercise of mere legislative power.”63 
Underscoring that Ping’s property claim was not based in contract law64 
and echoing arguments that Hoadly made in his brief, Carter noted, 
It will be observed that the right of the appellant to return to the 
United States is based . . . upon a title or right to be in that 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Under the common law, the grantor is the typically the person who owns an estate in 
fee simple and the grantee is the person who acquires property from the grantor. 
 58. The government may not deprive a person of property without due process of law. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 59. See Hoadly, Brief for Appellant, supra note 55, at 20. 
 60. Id. Curiously, Hoadly does not expand on his eminent domain argument by 
explaining, for example, what would constitute just compensation for the taking of Ping’s 
property. Further, it should be noted that although this line of argument invoked eminent 
domain, Hoadly subsequently relates such vested right as part of a contractual obligation. Id. 
at 34-35. 
 61. See Carter, Appellant Brief, supra note 14, at 3. 
 62. See id. at 4.  
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 5 (“[T]he right of appellant to return to the United States is based, so far 
as above insisted upon, not upon any contract between him and that Government.”). 
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country when the writ issued—a title or right fully acquired by, 
and vested in him by his coming here under the permission of 
the laws and treaties under which he came. It was granted to him 
by law; but, when once granted, could not be taken away by 
mere law.65  
Again, Ping’s argument here is that his vested right was similar to title in 
fee simple that may not be taken automatically by mere legislation. Indeed, 
Carter points out that such a right was a “valuable right like an estate in 
lands, and the taking of it away would necessarily involve the taking away 
of his liberty.”66 
Carter raised a third property claim: not only did Ping have a right to re-
enter the United States but he also had “a lawful right to be in that United 
States.”67 Emphasizing that Ping had been a resident of California for 
twelve years after deciding to make a permanent home in the United States 
as a result of the Burlingame Treaty,68 Ping cannot be “ejected from the 
United States by mere legislation.”69 In so doing, Carter’s theory is slightly 
distinguishable from Hoadly’s by underscoring Ping’s connections to the 
United States as a long-term resident. Hoadly’s argument appears to invoke 
a property right that is grounded on continuous and long-term possession 
and use of property (which in this case would be the United States). 
Establishing one’s deep roots to property is an accepted rationale that has 
long animated two ways of acquiring a property right—adverse 
possession70 and prescriptive easement.71  
However, neither adverse possession nor prescriptive easement is 
directly on point because both doctrines require non-permissive possession 
or use of property over a statutory period for property rights to vest.72 
Certainly, in this case, Ping had resided in the United States for over a 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 4. 
 68. See id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
611, 665 (1988) (explaining that under adverse possession, “property owners lose their 
property to a possessor of that property if the possession has been sufficiently open and 
longstanding and without the owner's permission”).  
 71. See id. at 669 (recognizing that when a prescriptive easement is established, “the 
true owner loses not the entire property but the right to prevent another from using her 
property in a specific way”).  
 72. See id. at 665-69 (explaining the requirements for adverse possession and 
prescriptive easements).  
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decade, which would satisfy some jurisdictions’ requirements for adverse 
possession or prescriptive easement.73 However, Ping’s possession or use of 
a residence in the United States was permissive during his residence in the 
country. As explained previously, the original Chinese Exclusion Act did 
not apply to Chinese laborers like Ping who were present in 1880 when 
Congress passed the law in 1882. Non-permissive access to the United 
States would not begin until his exclusion from the United States based on 
the 1888 amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act that voided his 
certificate. 
A fourth line of property argument focused on the concept of labor as 
property. Specifically, Harvey Brown and Thomas Riordan argued that 
denying Ping and other Chinese laborers the right to re-enter the United 
States violated their right to acquire property.74 Quoting In re Tiburcio 
Parrott, a case which struck down a law that penalized the employment of 
Chinese laborers,75 Brown noted “[n]o enumeration would, I think, be 
attempted of the privileges, immunities . . . of man in civilized society 
which would exclude the right to labor for a living.” Evoking John Locke’s 
labor theory of property,76 Brown further explained that the right to labor is 
“an inviolable as the right of property, for property is the offspring of 
labor.”77 Applying these principles to Ping’s situation, Brown maintained 
that, under the Burlingame Treaty, Ping “had acquired the right to live in 
the United States to labor, to acquire property and to protect it in the same 
manner as any citizen would.”78 Indeed, because Ping had been a resident 
of the United States for several years, he had presumably acquired property 
as a result of his labor and thus, his exclusion from the United States means 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Ping resided in the United States for twelve years prior to his trip to China. See 
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582 (mentioning that Ping resided in the United States from 
1875 until 1887).  
 74. See Harvey S. Brown & Thomas Riordan, Brief for Appellant at 1, 5, Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446) (italics omitted) [hereinafter Brown 
& Riordan, Appellant Brief].  
 75. 1 F. 481, 499 (C.C.D. 1880) (invalidating California statute that criminalized the 
employment of Chinese laborers). 
 76. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290-91 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (stating that every person has the right to the products or fruits of 
one’s labor). 
 77. See Brown & Riordan, Appellant Brief, supra note 74, at 7 (quoting In re Tiburcio 
Parrot, 1 F. at 498). 
 78. See id. at 9. 
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that he—as well as thousands of other Chinese immigrants—are being 
prevented from enjoying the fruits of their employment.79  
In sum, although Ping’s “right to return” to the United States might not 
constitute property as typically understood under the common law, Ping 
nevertheless claimed that it was sufficiently close to it. Through four 
specific property arguments, Ping contended that the government could not 
automatically take away his right without violating his due process rights.  
B. The Government’s Response 
Expectedly, the briefs filed on behalf of the United States disagreed that 
Ping had a vested property right to return.80 The United States brief 
contended that Ping’s residence in the country was “only by indulgence of 
the Government”—that is, by “permission only.”81 The State of California 
submitted two briefs in support of the United States. The Attorney General 
of California submitted a brief, and so did two lawyers who were appointed 
by the state. 
The California Attorney General G.A. Johnson acknowledged that a 
treaty may confer certain rights on non-citizens, including “rights of 
property by descent or inheritance.”82 Yet, Attorney General Johnson 
asserted that there “are no rights of property by descent or inheritance” or 
“fixed private property rights” that were involved in the case.83 Consistent 
with the lower court’s decision, Attorney General Johnson articulated a 
very traditional conception of what constitutes property. 
The two state-appointed attorneys, John F. Swift and Stephen M. White, 
provided a more fulsome counter-argument to Ping’s property assertions. 
At the outset, this brief also conceded that if a treaty allowed a non-citizen 
to purchase property, then such property “is absolutely and beyond the 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See Transcript of Record, supra note 44, at Motion to Advance, 2.  
 80. There were three briefs filed on behalf of the United States: brief filed by Solicitor 
General G.A. Jenks, brief submitted by the Attorney General G.A. Johnson, and a brief filed 
by Stephen M. White and John F. Swift, who appear to be counsel appointed by the State of 
California. 
 81. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446). The brief did not elaborate further 
and instead focused on addressing Ping’s other arguments.  
 82. Brief of the State of California Attorney General as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 8-9, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446). 
 83. See id. at 9.  
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reach of Congressional attack.”84 Yet, similar to the United States’ position, 
the special counsel’s brief described Ping’s ability to enter the country as a 
privilege.85 Echoing the bundle of sticks analogy often used to describe 
property rights,86 this brief rejected the idea that Congress did not have the 
“right to exclude” non-citizens like Ping.87 Moreover, the appointed 
counsel’s brief maintained that Ping was not deprived of his property in 
violation of his due process. Underscoring the view that property refers to 
“real property,” the brief states that, “[n]o one is attempting to get any of 
Ping’s property[;] in fact, it is not shown that he has an estate[.]”88 
C. The Supreme Court’s Property Analysis 
Ultimately, Ping’s arguments that he had a vested right to return to the 
United States were unavailing.89 Although the Supreme Court recognized 
that the Burlingame Treaty conferred certain rights to Chinese laborers, it 
held that a subsequently enacted treaty—the 1888 amendments—trumped 
the earlier treaty.90 Importantly, the Court rejected Ping’s claim that his 
right to return constituted property akin to an estate in land. It distinguished 
Ping’s certificate which it described as “personal and untransferable” in 
character from those property rights that flow from treaties that vest and the 
ownership of which cannot be destroyed.91 
Critically, the Supreme Court focused on qualities that make a “thing” 
property. One such trait, explained the Court, is that property is “capable of 
sale and transfer or other disposition.”92 Ping’s certificate, however, was 
“personal and untransferable” and thus, lacked the essential qualities of 
property. Accordingly, it may be voided. 93 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Brief of John F. Swift and Stephen M. White, Counsel Appointed by the State of 
California, at 10, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446) 
[hereinafter Brief of Swift & White]. 
 85. See id. at 11.  
 86. For examples of courts using the “bundle of sticks” metaphor, see Audrey G. 
McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Prediction, Racialized Geography, and 
Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 864 n.35. 
 87. Brief of Swift & White, supra note 84, at 11-12. 
 88. Id. at 15. 
 89. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603 (holding that nothing in the treaties “impair[s] 
the validity of the act of congress of October 1, 1888”).  
 90. See id. at 600. 
 91. Id. at 609.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 610.  
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Despite rejecting Ping’s property claim, the Supreme Court used 
property language to describe the scope of Ping’s rights. Specifically, the 
Supreme Court characterized Ping’s certificate as a license. A license is a 
personal property right given by an owner or possessor of property to a 
non-possessor.94 Importantly, a license may typically be revoked at any 
time.95 Applying that property concept in this case, the Court noted that, 
“Whatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers may have obtained, previous 
to the [Chinese Exclusion Act] act of October 1, 1888, to return to the 
United States after their departure, is held at the will of the government, 
revocable at any time, at its pleasure.”96 
Ironically, although the Supreme Court refused to accept Ping’s property 
claim, the Court’s holding nevertheless resulted in the recognition of strong 
property rights in favor of the United States. In particular, by holding that 
Congress may exclude Ping—a long-term non-citizen resident of the United 
States—and other Chinese laborers, the Supreme Court essentially 
articulated that the federal government had a very strong, unimpaired and 
absolute right to exclude. The right to exclude has long been considered the 
strongest “stick” in the bundle of property rights.97 One of the normative 
justifications for protecting the right to exclude is its ability to promote an 
owner’s autonomy and sovereignty over her estate, including the right to 
exclude persons from her property with the protection of the state.98 The 
connection between property and sovereignty is particularly evident in 
Chae Chan Ping. Stating that the United States is a sovereign nation, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that the federal government has the duty to 
“preserve [the nation’s] independence, and give security against foreign 
aggression and encroachment.”99 Thus, here, the Supreme Court 
emphasized the role of the United States’ right to exclude as a means of 
achieving safety and security within its own property. 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 512 cmt. a (1944) (defining a license, 
generally, as “any permitted unusual freedom of action”).  
 95. See id. § 519 cmt. a (explaining that licenses are “terminable at the will of the 
possessor”). But see infra Part IV (discussing circumstances that prohibit the revocation of 
licenses). 
 96. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.  
 97. See Kristine S. Tardiff, Analyzing Every Stick in the Bundle: Why the Examination 
of a Claimant’s Property Interests Is the Most Important Inquiry in Every Fifth Amendment 
Takings Case, FED. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 30, 31 (explaining that the right to exclude “is 
frequently described as the most ‘fundamental’ and ‘treasured’ of all property rights”).  
 98. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927), 
available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol13/iss1/3.  
 99. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
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Importantly, the Supreme Court’s holding illuminates the power of the 
right to exclude and its connections to exclusions from private and public 
property on the basis of race.100 In this case, the Court notes that the federal 
government has the power to exercise its right of exclusion to address 
aggression in whatever form it may appear, including when “vast hordes of 
[foreign] people are crowding in upon” the United States.101 The Chinese 
Exclusion Act cast Chinese laborers as the aggressors that needed to be 
excluded from the United States. Although it was not the first immigration 
law that excluded on the basis of race,102 it was the first one that explicitly 
made race an exclusionary factor and one that escaped equal protection 
review.103 Indeed, the Supreme Court did not find the law’s race-based 
content problematic, noting that if Congress leaders determine that “the 
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not 
assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace . . . [such] determination is 
conclusive upon the judiciary.”104  
Through these words, the Supreme Court established Congress’s plenary 
power over immigration and, in so doing, upheld Ping’s exclusion from the 
United States. Thus, Ping ultimately had to be ejected from the United 
States. Having been released on bond, Ping was residing in Chinatown, San 
Francisco during the pendency of his case. He continued to reside in 
                                                                                                                 
 100. I have written previously on the extent to which property law was deployed to 
exclude persons on the basis of race. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. 
California: At the Intersection of Property, Race and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979 
(2010) [hereinafter Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama]; see also ALFRED BROPHY, ALBERTO 
LOPEZ & KALI MURRAY, INTEGRATING SPACES: PROPERTY AND RACE (2010).  
 101. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. The Court’s description of Chinese as 
aggressors who were “crowding” upon the United States is troubling and consistent with the 
anti-Chinese sentiment of the period. As noted earlier, the population of Chinese in the 
United States during this period was approximately two percent of the U.S. entire 
population. See supra note 24.  
 102. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration 
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 641 (2005) (stating that in 1875, Congress passed the Page 
Act, which was the first federal restrictive immigration statute and it was done to target 
primarily Chinese women). 
 103. To be sure, as Jack Chin has pointed out, Ping did not bring a claim that the Chinese 
Exclusion Act was racially discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping, supra note 1, at 15. Even if he did, it 
would have failed. At that time, the Equal Protection Clause applied only to the states and 
although the Due Process of the Fifth Amendment later incorporated the equal protection 
principle, the Supreme Court has noted that the Fifth Amendment does not provide a 
guarantee against discrimination by Congress. Id. 
 104. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
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Chinatown after the Supreme Court issued its opinion. A news article 
reported that it was not until “the indignant howl of an ever-vigilant press” 
that the authorities were awakened “to a realization of the fact that Ping . . . 
had intended to stay.”105 As a result, government authorities contacted one 
of his lawyers, Riordan, who then brought Ping to the dock to be placed on 
a ship to sail back to China.106 Fearing that Ping might “leave the vessel in a 
surreptitious manner,” federal authorities reportedly “locked him in a 
statesroom and set a guard over it until the vessel should set out to sea.”107 
He was never heard from again.108  
III. Why Property in Immigration Law 
Ping’s articulation of his property right did not fit the mold of what the 
Supreme Court understood as property. But what if he prevailed? What 
difference would it had made had the Supreme Court recognized that Ping 
had a property right to return to the United States? This Part explores the 
answers to these questions and contends that if Ping succeeded, the plenary 
power doctrine would arguably look different today.  
A. Ping’s “New Property” Claim 
To understand the difference that Ping’s property claim would have 
made to his assertion that he should be allowed to re-enter the United 
States, it would be helpful to consider why his property argument failed to 
convince the Court in the first instance. As may have been evident from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion, the Court had a traditional understanding of what 
constituted “property.”109 Justice Field emphasized “real property” as the 
type of property he believed would have received protection from 
treaties.110 Additionally, he emphasized that the concept of a government 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Chan Ping Leaves US.: He Refuses to Pay His Fare and the Company Takes Him as 
a Guest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1889, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=990DE6DF1130E633A25751C0A96F9C94689FD7CF. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See Paul Yin, The Narratives of Chinese-American Litigation During the Chinese 
Exclusion Era, 19 ASIAN AM. L.J. 145, 152 (2012) (explaining that a few months after the 
case, Chae Chan Ping was deported and banned from returning). 
 109. See supra Part II.A (examining the district court’s analysis of Ping’s property 
claim); supra Part II.C (analyzing the Supreme Court’s examination of Ping’s property 
argument). 
 110. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.  
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entitlement—such as the conferral of a right to return to the United States—
could not possibly constitute property.111  
Yet, although the notion of a government entitlement as property was 
incomprehensible to the Supreme Court in 1889, it would eventually 
become recognized as such in the next century. Specifically, in 1964, in a 
groundbreaking article, Professor Charles Reich called for the recognition 
of a “new property.”112 He explained that the government has become a 
major source of wealth by distributing different types of rights, benefits, 
privileges, services, and power to various individuals.113 These varied forms 
of “largess” or public entitlements have become the main source of wealth 
or income for many individuals.114 The governments that issue these 
benefits or “largess” have acquired tremendous power115 over the 
distribution, regulation and maintenance of these benefits and privileges.116 
Accordingly, Reich contended that these benefits constituted new forms of 
property and, similar to traditional property, should be given legal 
protection.117 Because these “forms of largess . . . are closely linked to 
status[,]” they must be “deemed to be held as of right.”118 As such, they 
should be bound to a system of regulation “rather than a system based upon 
denial, suspension and revocation.”119  
Notably, Reich’s call for the protection of government benefits and 
privileges as property led to important individual procedural due process 
protection.120 In the landmark case Goldberg v. Kelley,121 the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See id.  
 112. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964). 
 113. See id. at 734-38. 
 114. See id. at 734-39. 
 115. See id. at 746 ( “When government—national, state or local—hands out something 
of value, whether a relief check or a television license, government’s power grows forthwith; 
it automatically gains such power as is necessary and proper to supervise its largess.”). 
 116. See id. at 751 ( “[G]ranting, regulation, and revocation of government largess is 
carried on by procedures which, in varying degrees, represent short-cuts that tend to 
augment the power of the grantor at the expense of the recipient.”). 
 117. See id. at 785. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Ronald A. Cass & Jack M. Beermann, Throwing Stones at the Mudbank: The 
Impact of Scholarship on Administrative Law, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1993) (explaining 
the significance of Reich’s article influencing the Supreme Court); Rebecca E. Zietlow, 
Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 9, 12-14 (1997) (referring to Reich as the “‘father’ of the due process revolution”). 
But see David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1780 (2013) 
(noting that after the Supreme Court decided Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), “the 
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Court cited Reich in noting that a welfare entitlement was “more like 
‘property’ than a ‘gratuity’”122 and thus, a welfare recipient should be 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing “before the termination of benefits.”123 
Rejecting the view that a welfare benefit is a privilege rather than a right, 
the Court explained that public assistance benefits provide their recipients 
with daily essentials including food, housing, and medical care.124 
Accordingly, beneficiaries have the procedural right under the Due Process 
Clause to a hearing on whether the benefit should be discontinued.125 Since 
Goldberg, the Supreme Court and other courts applied Reich’s “new 
property” to other contexts.126  
Ping was thus ahead of his time when he contended that the government-
issued certificate evidencing his right to return constituted property that 
could not be automatically revoked without violating his constitutional 
rights.127 And, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court seemed strongly 
resistant to according “property” status to Ping’s claim. Rejecting the 
characterization of Ping’s asserted right to return as property, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
remainder of Reich’s insights into the role of property in protecting individual rights in 
modern society was largely forgotten”). 
 121. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 122. See id. at 262 n.8. 
 123. See id. at 259. 
 124. See id. at 262-64. 
 125. See id. at 268. 
 126. See, e.g., Geoffrey Jones, The Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights of Interdicted 
Haitian Refugees, 21 HASTINGS CONTS. L.Q. 1071, 1087-88 (1994) (noting cases that cited 
Reich’s “New Property” article); see also Joseph Blocker, Reputation as Property in Virtual 
Economies, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 120 (2009) (applying Reich’s “new property” to 
reputation online); Paula Lindsey Wilson, Note, Rejection of the New Property Right Theory 
as Viewed Through the Rear Window: Stewart v. Abend, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 189-90 
(1990) (exploring how different courts treated “new property” in the context of copyright). 
But see Super, supra note 120, at 1780 (discussing the limits of Reich’s influence since 
Goldberg).  
 127. At least one legal scholar has applied Reich’s concept of “new property” in the 
immigration context. See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Property, Visa as 
Collateral, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1084-85 (2011). Brown wrote,  
Although a visa would not typically be thought of as either a franchise or a 
license, in fact, a visa is deeply analogous to both. Indeed, U.S. visas may be 
described as licenses to work in the United States. Like licenses, visas make it 
possible for their recipients to engage in particular kinds of work. Like other 
forms of licensees, visa holders are only able to receive what is usually their 
primary source of income because they hold visas. Thus, the “new property” 
analogy fits.  
Id. at 1085.  
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instead classified Ping’s right to return as a mere benefit.128 Notably, the 
Court’s framing of Ping’s right as not property did not rest on his status as a 
non-citizen. The Court acknowledged that non-citizens’ property rights 
may, depending on the circumstances, deserve protection. It mentioned, for 
instance, that there are some property rights held by non-citizens that 
emanate from treaties and are thus enforceable among private parties, 
including “rights of property by descent or inheritance.129 Importantly, the 
Court acknowledged that the extinguishment of a treaty would not abolish 
these property rights.130 The Court explained, however, that what Ping had 
was a privilege or a benefit conferred to him by the government.131 
Crucially, such benefit was not protectable property. As the Court 
explained, “Between property rights not affected by the termination or 
abrogation of a treaty, and expectations of benefits from the continuance of 
existing legislation, there is as wide a difference as between realization and 
hopes.”132 
Yet, the fact that Ping merely had a license or benefit might not 
necessarily be detrimental to his property claim today.133 Applying Reich’s 
“new property” allows us to consider the value of the certificate to return to 
Ping and other Chinese laborers as well as the procedural protections that 
should have been accorded to their property. For Ping and the thousands of 
Chinese who had left the United States with the belief that they could 
return, the certificate constituted their return ticket that would have allowed 
them to continue working and residing in their country of residence. For 
many, the certificate would have given them the ability to recoup their 
possessions and perhaps reunite with their families. Seen from the lens of 
“new property,” Congress’s automatic revocation of Ping’s certificate and 
right to return may be regarded as a violation of Ping’s property rights.134 
  
                                                                                                                 
 128. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 610. 
 129. Id. (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)). 
 130. Id. (stating that it would be “most mischievous to admit that the extinguishment of 
the treaty extinguished the right to such estate”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. As Reich noted in his article, courts have described certain benefits or “largess” as 
“privileges” even though they should be considered “rights.” See Reich, supra note 112, at 
740.  
 134. See id. at 740 (“If the holder of a license had a ‘right,’ he might be entitled to a 
hearing before the license could be revoked; a ‘mere privilege’ might be revoked without 
notice or a hearing.”).  
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B. Difference that Property Would Have Made 
Although ultimately unsuccessful, Ping’s property claim allows us to 
imagine what the plenary power doctrine would have looked like had Ping 
prevailed. Arguably, had the Supreme Court accepted Ping’s contention 
that he had a vested property right to return, the plenary power would not 
be the absolute, powerful and unrestricted doctrine as it is today.135 That is, 
the Court would have recognized a limiting principle to the plenary power 
doctrine based on Ping’s individual property rights. Thus, at minimum, 
Ping (and other returning Chinese laborers who are also long-term residents 
of the United States and had permission to return) would have been entitled 
to a hearing on the validity of the automatic revocation of his certificate 
without notice. Perhaps more broadly, the Court would have acknowledged 
that some non-citizens deserve greater protection than other non-citizens 
because of their deeper connections to the United States. After all, Ping 
considered the United States to be his residence, having lived in California 
for over twelve years before he left for China. He was not an immigrant 
who was seeking entry for the first time but rather a long-term resident of 
the United States. Such long-term presence and link to the United States 
may be viewed to have matured in ways that would have conferred him 
with a non-revocable right to return. 
Thus, the Court would have rejected the view that the nation has an 
absolute right to exclude non-citizens under the plenary power doctrine. 
Instead, the Court would have established a qualified right to exclude—one 
that recognized that the federal government has the power to exclude non-
citizens but that, in some circumstances, such power must give way to the 
rights of some non-citizens to gain access to the United States. Had the 
Court inaugurated such a more tempered right to exclude in the first 
instance, immigration law as we know it would look remarkably different. 
To be sure, today, lawful permanent residents are accorded more rights 
than other non-citizens when seeking to return to the United States. In 
Landon v. Plasencia,136 the Supreme Court held that lawful permanent 
residents are entitled to due process rights during exclusion hearings.137 
Maria Plasencia, a lawful permanent resident of the United States for five 
years, was excluded at the border after a brief visit to Mexico and 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See Chin, Chae Chan Ping supra note 1, at 1 (“Congressional power to determine 
who may come or stay, and who may not, is virtually unrestricted.”). 
 136. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
 137. See id. at 31. 
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attempting to illegally transport noncitizens to the United States.138 
Although the Court maintained that Plasencia must go through an exclusion 
and not deportation hearing where she would have the burden of proving 
her admissibility, it recognized that “once an alien gains admission to our 
country and begins to develop ties that go with permanent residence, his 
constitutional status changes accordingly.”139 As such, she was entitled to 
an analysis that would have balanced her interests and the interests of the 
government.140 Congress would later amend the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to provide that lawful permanent residents who are seeking 
to re-enter the United States would be treated differently from those non-
citizens who are seeking to enter the first time.141 Under section 
101(a)(13)(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), lawful 
permanent residents are regarded as not seeking admission unless, among 
other things, they abandoned or relinquished their status142 or had been 
absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 
days.143 These constitutional and statutory protections conferred to lawful 
permanent residents in the context of (re)entering the United States show 
that certain non-citizens are bestowed more rights than others. 
Yet, those rights are generally limited to lawful permanent residents who 
have taken “innocent, casual and brief excursions”144 or who have not been 
absent from the United States for more than 180 days. Indeed, it is unclear 
whether Ping would have been allowed to re-enter the United States under 
Plasencia and section 101(a)(13)(c) today. Because he was absent from the 
United States for over one year and four months, he would have to establish 
that he did not abandon his residency. Additionally, as a result of Ping’s 
lengthy absence from the United States, immigration officers would likely 
invoke section 101(a)(13)(c) and deem Ping as a non-citizen seeking 
admission for the first time. He would then have to show that he is both 
admissible and not inadmissible.145 
                                                                                                                 
 138. For a more detailed analysis of Landon v. Plasencia, see Kevin R. Johnson, Maria 
and Joseph Plasencia’s Lost Weekend: The Case of Landon v. Plasencia, in IMMIGRATION 
STORIES 221-44 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). 
 139. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32. 
 140. See id. at 34 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1975)).  
 141. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(i) (2012). 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(ii).  
 144. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963). 
 145. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (providing that a non-citizen seeking admission must 
show that she is clearly and beyond any doubt admissible).  
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In brief, revisiting Ping’s property claims—albeit futile given the nature 
of his arguments as akin to “new property”—over a century later allows us 
to visualize what the starting point of immigration law could have looked 
like. It is plausible that had Ping convinced the Supreme Court that he had a 
property right to re-enter the United States that the plenary power doctrine 
would have some limits at least. Such qualified right to exclude would have 
taken into account the rights of, at minimum, lawful permanent residents of 
the United States and, perhaps more broadly, to any non-citizen long-term 
residents with deep ties and connections to the country who are seeking to 
return or re-enter the United States. 
IV. Intersection of Immigration and Property 
Examining Ping’s property claims is valuable for another and more 
extensive reason: it allows an exploration of the ways in which property law 
intersects with immigration law and how each doctrine might inform the 
other.146 To be sure, I recognize that immigration law and property law are 
                                                                                                                 
 146. I have previously examined the ways in which property law may be used in 
immigration law. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Citizenship for the Guest Workers of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 525 (2015) (arguing for the conferral of 
lawful permanent residency and citizenship to long-term guest workers in the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands using the concept of jus nexi—acquisition 
of citizenship based on one’s deeply rooted and strong connections to a territory and a theory 
that borrows from property law’s adverse possession). For more information on how 
property law and immigration law intersect, see generally Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama, 
supra note 100, at 1003-12 (discussing connections between immigration and property law). 
Other scholars have also explored the connection between the two. See e.g., Brown, Visa as 
Property, supra note 127 at 1085 (discussing the immigration and property connection, how 
visas are a form of “new property” by providing a certain legal status granted by the 
government that allows access to a particular set of economic benefits); David A. Super, A 
New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1812-18 (2013) (examining the parallels 
between immigration law and property law); Leti Volpp, Imaginings of Space in 
Immigration Law, 9 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 456, 466-67 (2013) (examining the metaphor 
of immigration as property). Scholars and commentators have also examined how property 
law may be deployed in immigration law. See AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: 
CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 184-89 (2009) (evoking the adverse possession 
principle in arguing for granting citizenship to undocumented immigrants based on the 
length of their stay in the receiving country); Monica Gomez, Note, Immigration by Adverse 
Possession: Common Law Amnesty for Long-Residing Illegal Immigrants in the U.S., 22 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 105 (2007); Timothy J. Lukes & Minh T. Hoang, Open and Notorious: 
Adverse Possession and Immigration Reform, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 123 (2008). For a 
broader and more theoretical exploration of property law in immigration, see Jeremy 
Waldron, Immigration: A Lockean Approach (NYU School of Law Pub. Research Paper No. 
15-37, May 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652710. Other 
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two distinct areas of law. Property law is private law and developed from 
the common law,147 which relied heavily on William Blackstone (dominion 
and control),148 John Locke (labor),149 and Jeremy Bentham (settled 
expectations).150 By contrast, immigration law is public law and is based on 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.151  
Yet, a closer look at these two areas reveals overlooked commonalities. 
In particular, both deal with the tension between a person’s right to gain 
entry to or remain in a particular space and the right of the owner or 
possessor to exclude the person seeking access or desiring to stay in the 
property. In property law, this tension occurs in a number of situations, 
including when an individual is seeking entry to property that is privately 
held,152 private property that is open to the public,153 or a privately owned 
place that is recognized as a place of public accommodation.154 
Additionally, property law recognizes that persons who do not have 
privileged entry or consent to enter property may be ejected from private 
                                                                                                                 
scholars have examined the ways in which property law affects the lives of non-citizens. See, 
e.g., Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen 
Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, passim (2013); Allison Brownell Tirres, Property 
Outliers: Non-Citizens, Property Rights and State Power, 27 GEO. IMM. L.J. 77, passim 
(2012); Keith Aoki, No Right to Own? The Early Twentieth Century “Alien Land Laws” as 
a Prelude to the Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, passim (1998). 
 147. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES 12, 736 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing how trespass and the landlord-tenant 
relationship are property concepts developed from common law).  
 148. “There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the 
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2 (1753). 
 149. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17-18 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 
1952) (“[W]hatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, 
he has mixed labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.”). 
 150. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 138 (Boston: Weeks, Jordan & Co., 
R. Hildreth trans. 1840) (“[The] idea of property consists in an established expectation . . . if 
being able to draw . . . an advantage from the thing possessed.”).  
 151. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012).  
 152. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371-75 (N.J. 1971) (discussing whether 
defendants’ entrance upon private property to aid migrant farmworkers constituted trespass).  
 153. See Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 372 (N.J. 1982) (discussing 
whether owners of places open to the public enjoy an absolute right to exclude patrons). 
 154. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000a-6 (2012); see Denny v. 
Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the list in § 2000a is 
exhaustive). 
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property.155 Armed with trespass law, owners can thus remove non-owners 
and seek damages for harms associated with unprivileged entry.156 Such 
power to both exclude and remove non-owners is based on the right to 
exclude—which, as noted earlier, has long been regarded as the strongest 
“stick” in the bundle of rights that attend private property.157  
This conflict between access and removal that transpires in property law 
also takes place in immigration law. The issue in the admissions context is 
whether a person should gain entry to the United States. Although the 
phrase “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to be 
free”158 is inscribed on the base of the Statueof Liberty, the United States is 
not a place that is publicly available or open to all persons. First, all 
persons, citizen and non-citizen alike, are required to present themselves at 
a port of entry and seek permission to enter the Untied States.159 Second, 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) details which persons may be 
admitted to the United States.160 Citizens may not be excluded from 
entering the country; non-citizens, by contrast, may be denied entry.161 
Moreover, non-citizens’ ability to remain in the United States may be cut 
off.162 That is, non-citizens, despite their length of stay in the United States, 
may be removed or deported from the country.163 Thus, the United States’ 
ability to deny a visa, deny one’s entry to the U.S. border (whether one has 
a visa), or remove a non-citizen from the United States are immigration 
law’s expressions of the right to exclude.  
Recognizing that both property law and immigration law administer who 
belongs in a particular space is valuable because it prompts us to examine 
both areas of law more closely to consider what lessons may be drawn from 
                                                                                                                 
 155. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 27 (2010). 
 156. See Shack, 277 A.2d at 374-75 (discussing whether defendants’ entrance upon 
private property to aid migrant farmworkers constituted trespass and invaded possessory 
right). 
 157. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (stating 
that “the power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured 
strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights”). 
 158. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS (1889). 
 159. See 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (2012) (regulating the admission of citizens and non-citizens in 
the United States); Inspection of Persons Applying for Admission, 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a-b) 
(2012).  
 160. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (listing which non-citizens are inadmissible to the United 
States).  
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. § 1227. 
 163. “Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this chapter or any 
other law of the United States . . . is deportable.” Id. § 1227(a)(1)(B).  
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each one.164 For instance, as some legal scholars have pointed out, the 
traditional view of the absolute right to exclude in property law has changed 
over time. Various statutes and public policy reasons have placed 
limitations on the ability of possessors of property to exclude non-owners. 
Thus, in some contexts, courts have recognized that owners may not 
exclude non-owners from their private property. Consider for example a 
license. The term license, as noted earlier, refers to a permit.165 In property 
law, a license may be revoked at any time.166 Yet, it is also the case that at 
some point, a license may become irrevocable and this license will become 
an implied easement.167 The holder of this implied easement acquires a 
permanent right of access.168 Had this development in property law been 
applied in Chae Chan Ping, Ping’s license could have been viewed as some 
type of an implied easement, which would have given him the ability to 
return to his home.  
Indeed, one area in property law that offers a rich site of exploration for 
its potential application to immigration law is what scholars refer to as 
“social relations theory” of property169 and part of the development of 
“progressive” theories in property.170 This theory moves away from 
                                                                                                                 
 164. It should be noted that one drawback of examining the property and immigration 
analogy is the way in which the non-citizen seeking access to the United States may be 
viewed as the “intruder” or burglar in a trespass action. See Volpp, supra note 114, at 467 
(examining the concept of the undesirable non-citizen/undocumented immigrant has been 
cast as trespassers through local criminal prosecutions).  
 165. See Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ky. 1976) (discussing license in the 
context of easements by estoppel). 
 166. Indus. Disposal Corp. of America v. City of E. Chicago, Dep’t of Water Works, 407 
N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Eileen T. Quigley, Inc. v. Miller Family Farms, 
Inc., 629 A.2d 110, 116 (N.J. App. Div. 1993); Tarin's, Inc. v. Tinley, 2000-NMCA-048, ¶ 
22, 129 N.M. 185, 3 P.3d 680 (Ct. App. 1999) ([N]otice goes to the reasonableness of the 
opportunity a licensee is afforded to remove his personal property from the servient estate, 
not to the revocability of the license.”); City of Norwood v. Forest Converting Co., 476 
N.E.2d 695, 703 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Port of Coos Bay v. Dep’t of Revenue, 691 P.2d 100, 
103 (Or. 1984). 
 167. Holbrook, 532 S.W.2d at 765. 
 168. See id. at 766. 
 169. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2-19 (2001); Stephen R. 
Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 
OF PROPERTY 36 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
 170. See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 743 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: 
Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009). But see 
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thinking of property as a relationship between a person and thing and 
towards thinking of property rights as about the relationship between 
persons with respect to valued resources.171 The starting place in modern 
property law is not about one’s ability to exclude from her bounded 
property172 but rather on how property rights have shaped people’s 
relationships with each other and how relationships among people have 
affected rights to property.173 This approach to property law recognizes 
limits to property rights, including the right to exclude, such that a private 
property owner must give way to the rights of non-owners for various 
reasons, including public policy.174  
By highlighting the intersection between property and immigration law, I 
hope to prompt further examination of how property law might inform the 
development of immigration law. There are a number of questions that may 
be explored. For instance, what might immigration law learn from 
progressive property? What would a “social relations theory” of 
immigration law look like? Should there be an unfettered right of return for 
lawful permanent residents? Indeed, should there be a right of return for 
citizens?175 And how would a social relations theory of immigration apply 
in situations affecting undocumented immigrants who have been criminally 
prosecuted for trespass or formerly undocumented immigrants who have 
acquired temporary status under the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals?176 By raising these questions, I hope to encourage further 
                                                                                                                 
Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CAL. 
L. REV. 107 (2013) (critiquing some progressive property theorists).  
 171. “The common conception of property as protection of individual control over valued 
resources is both intuitively and legally powerful.” Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. 
Penalvar, Joseph William Singer & Laura Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive 
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009).  
 172. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, REPRESENTATIONS, 
Spring 1990, at 162, 169 (discussing how property exacerbates the problem of boundary). 
 173. See id. at 177 (“Property really is a set of legal rules and norms that structure power 
and relationships.”). 
 174. See id. (“The power to exclude that our legal structure of property gives us is the 
starting point of all contract, all negotiation over use of, access to, and exchange of property 
and labor.”).  
 175. See Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271 
(2008) (contending that there should be a fundamental right for citizens to return to the 
United States); Leti Volpp, Citizenship Undone, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2579, passim (2007) 
(examining the ways in which U.S. citizens have been excluded from the country). 
 176. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration on 
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exploration of how developments in property law could lead to a more 
inclusive immigration law.177 
Conclusion 
On June 2, 1887, in accordance with the Chinese Exclusion Act, Chae 
Chan Ping obtained the following certificate from the Deputy Collector of 
Customs, which stated that: 
I certify that the Chinese laborer to whom this certificate is 
issued is entitled, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 
Congress, approved May 6th, 1882, as amended by the Act of 
July 5th, 1884, to return and re-enter the United States upon 
producing and delivering this certificate to the Collector of 
Customs of the district at which he shall seek to re-enter. 
Witness my hand and official seal, this second day of June, 
1887.178 
Ping believed that this certificate guaranteed that he had a right to return to 
the United States, which he regarded as his residence for twelve years. 
Indeed, he believed that such certificate evidenced a property right. 
Rejecting Ping’s asserted property rights, the Supreme Court in Chae Chan 
Ping established the absolute right of the United States to exclude non-
citizens.  
One-hundred-and-twenty-five years later, it is time to reconsider this 
absolute right to exclude that animates the plenary power doctrine. 
Ultimately, Ping’s property arguments, albeit unsuccessful, forces a re-
examination of the role that a non-citizen’s property interests in the United 
States should play in their ability to continue residing in this country. At 
bottom, Ping’s right to return as property should prompt recognition that 
                                                                                                                 
Customs Enforcement 1 (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-
exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
 177. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 127, at 1084-85. Note that Eleanor Brown has applied 
Reich’s theory in the context of visas for guest workers. To be sure, immigration law has 
recognized some exceptions to the right to exclude. For instance, the INA provides that 
persons who have a credible fear of being persecuted may be interviewed for purposes of 
determining whether they should be granted asylum, which would give them lawful 
permanent residency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). Moreover, as previously explained, courts 
have placed limitations on the ability of immigration officers to exclude certain non-citizens, 
such as lawful permanent residents, by ensuring that their exclusion hearings are subject to 
due process. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1982).  
 178. Chae Chan Ping’s Reentry Certificate, supra note 38. 
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persons who have spent considerable time in the United States deserve the 
right to return, reside and/or remain in the country that they call their home. 
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